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We describe a novel game-theoretic formulation of the optimal mobile agents’ placement
problem which arises in the context of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs). This problem
is modelled as a sequential multistage game. The deﬁnitions of both the Nash equilibrium
and cooperative solution are given. A modiﬁcation was proposed to ensure the existence
of a Nash equilibrium. A modelling environment for the analysis of diﬀerent strategies of
the players was developed in MATLAB. The programme generates various game situations
and determines each player move by solving respective optimisation problems. Using the
developed environment, two speciﬁc game scenarios were considered in detail. The proposed
novel algorithm was implemented and tested using Network Simulator 3 (NS-3). The results
show that the proposed novel algorithm increases network performance by using game theory
principles and techniques.
Keywords: MANET, dynamic games, multistage games, drone placement, graphs, Nash
equilibria, NS-3.
1. Introduction. Recently, there has been a growing interest in the qualitative
analysis and performance optimisation of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs). A
MANETs is formed by a collection of wireless nodes communicating directly with other
wireless nodes within their transmission range. To facilitate long distance communication,
i. e. to nodes outside of their transmission range, other nodes will forward the packet
towards the intended destination, thus these intermediate nodes along the path take on
the role of routers. A MANETs can operate independently of other networks and does not
require a predeﬁned infrastructure [1]. MANETs play an increasingly important role in data
communication networks and can be used for many applications, such as disaster recovery
after a natural catastrophe, for instance after an earth quake. The quick deployment time
of a MANETs makes it an ideal solution for search-and-rescue operations [2, 3] where the
existing communications infrastructure has been compromised or damaged. One of the
biggest problems associated with the operation of a MANETs (and other wireless broadcast
systems) is the need to share/use limited resources for the transmission of radio waves.
Inappropriate use of the resources can cause a severe degradation in network performance
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[4], another issue is the formation of communication paths because of the mobility of each
of the nodes within the network.
When the number of nodes wanting to transmit data increases, some of the routing
paths become congested and performance drops [5, 6]. The amount of data could also large,
for example, in the case of video streaming [7]. In some cases obstacles on the ground (lakes,
buildings, etc.) can cause link breakages. To mitigate the congestion of a given link, or to
ﬁx a link breakage, drones can be used as an intermediate node to facilitate the forwarding
of the traﬃc.
Recently, utilization of teams of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) became extremely
po-pular because they allow to extend the operational scope and signiﬁcantly reduce
response time [8]. Introducing mobile agents (drones) and ﬁnding the best possible
locations for their placement is the focus of this research. Recent research suggests forming
networks of UAVs using star topology, or uniform coverage [8, 9]. In most cases, the
number of drones is rather limited so they should be placed at strategic locations to
maximally increase the performance of the network [10]. Typically, research that discusses
MANETs uses all available nodes to form one big communications network; however, there
are situations when there may be several groups of nodes which are deployed to solve their
speciﬁc tasks. These grouping of nodes may or may not be able to communicate with each
other; the latter case corresponds to the situation when the nodes from diﬀerent groups
use diﬀerent frequency ranges [11].
We address the described problem in a decentralized manner. That is, we assume that
each group of nodes has a single control centre which is in possession of a single drone. The
goal of the control centre is to strategically place the drone to maximise the performance
of the subnetwork formed by the nodes. We assume that the number of available drones
doesn’t allow full coverage of the restricted zone.
It turns out that game theory lends itself perfectly well to addressing the described
problem. Game theory is a powerful tool to study situations of sharing limited resources,
and it deals with ﬁnding the best actions for individual decision makers (players) and for
ﬁnding the best available outcome [12, 13]. Using the game-theoretic methods one can
explicitly design and analyse strategic choices and model the decision-making process for
the player per their own interests. Much of the research conducted in the application of
the game theory in the area of MANETs is related to malicious or selﬁsh node detection
[14–18]. Existing applications also includes looking for large communities in the networks
[19–21], and investigation of cooperative games for various network games [22–24]. In this
paper, we take a diﬀerent approach and apply game theory to a special class of network
optimisation problem as described below. Note that there are several interesting results
on games theory applied to networks (e. g., [25–27]); however, this particular problem
statement appears to be novel thus opening wide opportunities for further research.
MATLAB was used to code the game theory algorithm to determine the most strategic
locations of the players drone. Results show that our algorithm can determine several
possible strategic locations for the placement of the drones. In addition, we were interested
how these placements would increase the overall performance of the MANETs, thus,
Network Simulator 3 (NS-3) was used to simulate a realistic network environment. This
research extends the published work in [28, 29].
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we give a formal description of the
considered objects and introduce the mathematical notation that will be used thereafter.
In section 3 we present the game-theoretic formulation of the drone placement problem.
Section 4 contains numerical examples which were coded in MATLAB. Section 5 discusses
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the implementation of the simulation and an analysis of the results, while in section 4 we
draw conclusions and outline the directions of future research.
2. Problem statement
2.1. Two types of communication networks. We consider the set N = {1, ...,N}
of N players, each player i ∈ N has a non-empty setMi = {1, ...,Mi} of agents. Each agent
mji ∈ Mi, i ∈ N , is characterized by a pair of coordinates (xji , yji ), M = ⋃i∈N Mi is the
set of all agents.
We assume that the agents can be located at the vertices of a uniform tiling of a
connected subset of the Euclidean plane C ⊂ R2 , for example see Fig. 1 (graph on the left)
which depicts the location of the agents at a moment in time for a given player. In practice,
one considers three kinds of uniform tiling: the triangular, the Cartesian (integer), and the
hexagonal tiling, which are formed by unit equilateral triangles, squares, and hexagons.
Henceforth, we will denote the set of all admissible coordinates by W ⊂ C. In the case
of the Cartesian grid, the coordinates of admissible points are the pairs of integer, i. e.
W ⊂ N2 ∩C.
Figure 1. Example of node placement (a) and transmission radius (b)
The agents form a communication network whose structure is determined by the
spatial alignment of agents and their transmission capabilities, Fig. 1 depicts the agents’
transmission radius as a gradient outer circle, the use of the gradient illustrates that
the transmitted signal attenuates with distance. The agent at (1,1) is in range with
agent at (2,1) and no other agent, however, the agent at position (3,2) is in range of
agents at positions (3,1) and (4,2). While the very nature of a MANETs suggests a
dynamic topology, we look at a snapshot of the network at a given point in time. Thus,
we assume that the communication network formed by the respective agents does not
change with time. In the following, we will consider two types of communication structures:
separate and joint use of communication infrastructure. We denote these two types of
communication networks by S (separate) and J (joint). Below we consider these two cases
in more detail.
S-network. The communication network consists of N disjoint graphs GSi =(VSi ,ESi ) , i ∈ N , where the sets of vertices VSi = {vki = (xki , yki )}Mik=1 are the collections
of the Cartesian coordinates of agents of player i; the sets of edges ESi = {ek,si = (vki , vsi ) ∈VSi × VSi ∶ dist (vki , vsi ) = 1} are the sets of all pairs of agents for player i, that are at a
unit Euclidean distance from each other. Note that the coordinate grid is such that the
distance between two neighbouring points is always equal to 1. We assume that each graph
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GSi is connected, i. e. there is a connected path between any two agents of a player. Note
that there are no connections (links) between the elements of diﬀerent subgraphs, i. e. the
agents of one player do not participate in the transmission between the agents of another
player, i. e. the agents of the ﬁrst player are transmitting at a range of frequencies diﬀerent
to that of the second player.
J-network. This case corresponds to a single communication network whose
communication structure is modelled by the graph GJ = (VJ ,EJ) , where the set of verticesVJ = {vki = (xki , yki )} , i ∈ N , vki ∈ Mi, is the collection of the Cartesian coordinates of all
agents; the set of edges EJ = {ek,s = (vki , vsj) ∈ VJ × VJ ∶ dist (vki , vsj) = 1} is the set of all
pairs of agents that are at a unit Euclidean distance from each other. As in the previous
case, we assume that the graph GJ is connected, i. e. there is a connected path between
any two agents.
Note that in both cases the coordinates of agents of two diﬀerent players can coincide.
While in the case of the S-network this would mean that the graphs may overlap (they
can be considered to lie in diﬀerent layers), for the J-network this would imply that there
is no direct connection between two agents located in the same point. This can be relaxed
by deﬁning the set of edges to be the set of all pairs of agents at the distance less or equal
to 1, i. e. ẼJ = {ek,s = (vki , vsj) ∈ VJ × VJ ∶ dist (vki , vsj) ⩽ 1}. Note, however, that this is
not important in the context of our research as we are interested in determining shortest
paths between diﬀerent nodes, which obviously must contain only non-overlapping nodes.
Note also that the choice of the grid can inﬂuence the connectivity of the respective
graphs and the related characteristics. While any agent located on a hexagonal grid can
have at most adjoin 3 edges, for the triangular grid this number can be up to 6.
2.2. Graph theoretic ingredients. Before proceeding to the game-theoretic
formulation of the problem we present a couple of facts from graph theory which will
be used hereafter.
Let G = (V ,E) be a graph and m be an agent. We deﬁne the union G̃ = G ∪ {m} to be
a new graph with an extended set of vertices Ṽ = V ∪ {m} and the accordingly adjusted
set of edges Ẽ . The union operation can be obviously extended to the case G ∪M , where
M is a set of agents M = {mi}ki=1. Note that G̃ can be disconnected.
The location of the agents is determined by the application or the scenario, for
example, consider a search and rescue operation, where a person was reported missing in
an area with lakes. The search operation might involve ﬁrstly coordinating the searching
of the circumference of the lake as depicted in Fig. 2.
The diameter of the graph [30] G, denoted by D (G), is the maximum among
all shortest paths between the agents in the graph, D (G) = max
(vi,vj)∈V×V
d (vi, vj), where
d (vi, vj) is the graph distance between two vertices vi and vj which is deﬁned as the
minimum length of the paths connecting them. If no such path exists, d (vi, vj) = ∞, in
our scenario (see Fig. 2) the maximum path among all shortest paths between the agents is
between the agents located at (1,1) and (1,5), for convenience we have assigned S (source)
and D (destination) to illustrate a communications path.
Since each graph GSi is connected, for the integer grid the diameter can be roughly
estimated as
2 (⌊√Mi⌋ − 1) ⩽D (GSi ) ⩽Mi − 1.
Obviously, while the upper bound does not depend on the type of the grid, the lower
bound does. Namely, it is minimal for the triangular grid and maximal for the hexagonal
one.
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Figure 2. Example 1 with one lake and two players
Furthermore, let V = {Vi} be a disjoint partition of the set of vertices V of the graphG, i. e. V = ⋃i Vi and Vi⋂Vj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ N , i ≠ j. We deﬁne the diameter of the graphG with respect to the element Vi of the partition V as
D (G,Vi) = max(vi,vj)∈Vi×Vid (vi, vj).
That is to say, when computing D (G,Vi) we consider only the paths between the
pairs of vertices from Vi. However, the intermediate vertices in the respective paths are
not required to be in Vi.
2.3. Mobile agent: drone. Each player has a mobile agent (drone) qi at their
disposal. The drone is placed at any admissible point in W. While all the agents have ﬁxed
coordinates, the position of the moving agent qi, i ∈ N , can be changed during the game.
The link between the moving agent and another agent is deﬁned similarly to the links
between the stationary agents. The moving agent qi can establish a link with any other
moving agent qj and with any stationary agent vpi , v
p
i ∈Mi, i ∈ N .
At the initial time, all drones are assumed to be located at some initial position q0.
We also assume that the Euclidean distance between q0 and the agents is greater than 1,
i. e. dist (q0, vki ) > 1 ∀i ∈ N , vki ∈ Mi. That is to say, the initial position of the drones is
such that they cannot establish communication with the agents of any other player.
Finally, we denote the set of all drones by Q = {qi}Ni=1 and the set of all drones except
the i-th one by Q−i = Q/{qi}.
3. Game formulation
3.1. Optimisation problem. At each step the i-th player aims at placing its moving
agent qi such that it minimises the diameter of the respective graph computed for all
player’s agents. Note that the drones themselves are not considered when computing the
diameter of the graph as they are not assumed to be the sources of any useful information,
but merely transmit the information packages between the agents. In this statement, we
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assume that each drone can be used by the agents of any player. The set of admissible
locations of the ith drone, W ∗i =W /Q, is introduced to avoid the collision of two drones.
For any type of communication structure the i-th player solves the following
optimisation problem:
q¯i = arg min
qi∈W∗i
D(G∗i ,Vi), (1)
where G∗ is the extended graph: for the case of the S-network, G∗i = GSi ∪Q−i ∪ {qi}, for
the J-network, G∗i = GJ ∪Q−i ∪ {qi}, respectively.
Accordingly, the payoﬀ (utility) function of the i-th player is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the diameter of the respective graph before placing the drone and afterwards:
Hi (G,Q) =D (G,Vi) −D (G∗i ,Vi) ⩾ 0, (2)
note that the payoﬀ function is always nonnegative. We will modify this deﬁnition for the
multi-staged game in the subsequent section.
3.2. Game aims and strategic (normal) form. The idea of the game is that
each of the players aims to place its moving agent such that it minimises the maximal
distance between the player’s agents while taking into account the existing communications
infrastructure. The degree by which the player minimises the mentioned distance is
captured by the payoﬀ function (2). Thus the goal of the player is to maximise its payoﬀ
function. The game ﬁnishes if none of the players can maximise further the respective
payoﬀ function.
The game is now formulated in normal form (see [31, 32]), i. e. the game is a triple
Γ = {N ,S,H} , where N is the set of players; S = ∏i∈N Si is a Cartesian product of
strategy sets Si. The set of available strategies for player i is Si ; H = {Hi}i=1,N . Here Hi
is the utility (payoﬀ) function for player i (see (2)).
The size of the action set of each player is limited from above: ∣Si∣ ⩽ ∣W ∣ −N + 1. This
estimate shows that our game is discrete and ﬁnite. However, the above estimate can be
greatly improved. For instance, for the rectangular grid and S-network the number of all
meaningful actions satisﬁes
4⌊√Mi −N + 1⌋ ⩽ ∣Si∣ ⩽ 2 (Mi + 1) ,
when computing the lower bound we considered the requirement that two drones cannot
occupy the same location.
3.3. Multistage game. The formulated game is a game with perfect information.
By the latter, we mean that all the players have all the required information about the
current and the previous network states, and all the elements of the game are common
knowledge. Furthermore, due to the obvious restrictions we conﬁne ourselves to the class
of pure strategies.
Below we concentrate on the sequential version of the game, rather than simultaneous.
In a sequential game, the players make their decisions in a certain, a priori ﬁxed order [31].
Thus, the order in which players choose their actions is a crucial parameter of the game.
Intuitively, the player that has the ﬁnal decision has an advantage over the other players.
Let σ ∶ N → N , be a bijective map (permutation of N , we assume it is random)
deﬁning the sequence of moves. We will refer to σ as the move sequence. At each stage,
the players make their choices per this sequence, i. e. ﬁrst moves the player σ(1), then
σ(2) and so forth. Each player places its drone in order to minimise the diameter of the
respective graph, i. e. solves problem (1).
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Initially, all drones are in the starting location Q0 = {q0, ..., q0}. When the ith player
moves the set Q updates: Q = Q−i ∪ {qi}, where qi is the solution of the respective
optimisation problem (1). Note that the decisions taken by subsequent players may change
the payoﬀ function of the player that made its move before. Therefore, the ﬁnal value of
the payoﬀ function is computed at the end of the stage, when all players have made their
moves. Each stage consists of all players making their moves according to sequence σ.
3.4. Solutions and equilibria.We are interested in two particular types of solutions
to the considered game: a cooperative solution and a Nash equilibrium solution. Below,
we give a formal deﬁnition of these concepts for the case of the S-network. All formulated
results will hold, mutatis mutandis, for the case of a J-network.
Definition 3.1. The solution QNE = {qNEi }i∈N is said to be the Nash equilibrium
solution if for any i ∈ N the following holds:
Hi (G,QNE) ⩾Hi (G,QNE−i ) ,
here QNE−i = {qNEj }j≠i ∪ {qi} , qi ∈ W ∗i . This condition can be reformulated in terms of
graph diameters:
D (GSi ∪QNE ,Vi) ⩽D (GSi ∪QNE−i ,Vi) .
In plain words, this means that any player cannot improve its payoﬀ function (i. e.
decrease the diameter of its graph) by unilaterally changing the position of its drone.
Definition 3.2. The solution QC is said to be the cooperative solution if it minimises
the sum of all individual payoﬀ functions: QC = arg min
Q∈W∗
∑i∈N D (GSi ∪Q,Vi), where W ∗ =
W ∗1 ×W ∗2 × ... ×W ∗N is the set of all admissible control actions.
Note that the cooperative solution always exists, as follows from the ﬁniteness of the
set of actions. Obviously, it can be non-unique. The case of Nash equilibrium is, however,
subtler.
While our dynamic game is represented in a strategic (normal) form, because of
the presence of sequential decision making, an alternative representation highlighting the
sequence of the moves can be used. The sequence of moves is thus represented in a game-
tree form, which is called an extensive form. It is known that every ﬁnite extensive-form
game with perfect information has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium [33]. However, the
existence of the Nash equilibrium does not imply that the game has a ﬁnite extensive-form
representation.
That is to say, even the Nash equilibrium solution exists, it may happen that it cannot
be reached by any sequence of players’ moves. Such situation occurs, when the Nash
equilibrium solution contains certain conﬁguration of drones, which we will call coherent
structures. One typical example of a coherent structure is shown in Fig. 3, which depicts
the case of a 3-bridge connecting the agents of three diﬀerent players (shown as a square,
a triangle, and a cross). The respective mobile agents are encircled. The ﬁgure presents a
fragment of the total communication network, in this ﬁgure, Fig. 3, three drones form a
bridge, the structure which cannot be reached without some extra coordination between
players. When the Nash equilibrium cannot be reached, the game will have a periodic
solution. This is similar to the situation observed in the theory of dynamic systems, when
a stable limit cycle surrounds an equilibrium point.
One approach to overcome this problem is to restrict the set of admissible players’
moves in order to ensure that the resulting game-tree is ﬁnite. This achieved by adding
an additional restriction to the optimisation problem (1). Namely, the players are to be
“benevolent”, i. e. when there are two equivalent alternatives, the i-th player chooses the
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Figure 3. The case of a 3-bridge
option which does not decrease the payoﬀ functions of other players [33]. In our case this
amounts to each player moving their own mobile agents so that it does not increase the
sub graph diameter of another player. We have the following theorem.
Theorem. Let all the players be benevolent, i. e. the set of admissible moves be
restricted to the W ∗i = W / {Qi−1 ∪W−i} , where W−i is the set of location that lead to
the decrease of the payoﬀs of the other players. Then the game-tree is ﬁnite and a Nash
equilibrium exists.
Note that the Nash equilibrium may not be unique. However, the question of the Nash
equilibrium uniqueness is beyond the scope of the paper.
The requirement that the players are to be benevolent is pretty natural as we consider
a search and rescue scenario which implies cooperation between diﬀerent players. However,
there can be diﬀerent scenarios in which the players compete with each other, for example,
the authors in [34] considers the use of drones as delivery systems of online goods and
explain that these are rapidly becoming a global norm, as corroborated by Amazon’s
“Prime Air” and Google’s “Project Wing” projects, in this work they explain that in this
scenario there would not likely be collaboration between the drones and that they would
face cyber and physical security challenges.
4. Numerical examples. The simulation of the multi-staged game for the S-network
has been implemented in MATLAB for two players. For testing purposes the world was
restricted by 5×7 and 8×8 rectangular grids. A number of restricted areas were introduced,
those which can be thought of as obstacles which prevent player placing agents, i. e. where
there might be a lake or building (see Figs 2 and 4). Only mobile agents are allowed to
be placed there. For each player, the placement algorithm places a predeﬁned number of
nodes randomly on the grid whilst ensuring a connected graph. Then the adjacency matrix
A = [αij] , i, j ∈ {1, ..,Mi}, was calculated such that
αij = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1, d (Vi,Vj) = 1,0,otherwise.
A modiﬁed Dijkstra algorithm was used to calculate the lengths of the paths between
the agents for each player [35]. Note that the lengths were computed only for the nodes
from a given subset as described in section 2. The length of the longest path was stored as
the player’s initial diameter. The code then evaluated if there was any competition for the
drones position by playing the ﬁrst stage of the game. After a suitable number of game
situations were generated and stored, the game itself was played. The game consisted of
a compulsory ﬁrst stage and then later stages run continuously until none of the players
could decrease their diameter.
We present two examples here, one is a game situation with one restricted area (lake),
the second illustrates the situation when one of the players ﬁnds a new position for their
drone, which increases the diameter of another player. Players consider their own diameter
optimisation, however, sometimes the use of the second drone can be seen by us as a bridge
building process. We should emphasize that the game is non-cooperative, and the players
have no intention to build a bridge at any stage.
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Figure 4. Example of the destruction of an optimal path the 9th strategy from table 3
One of the possible implementations of stage 2: initially drone 1 is at (4,6), drone 2 is at (4,5); at the
beginning of the stage 2 drone 1 goes to (5,5) to build a bridge, however, at this time, drone 2 can leave
(4,5) and take (4,6) instead (see example 2).
4.1. Example 1. Example 1, which is depicted on Fig. 2, presents a situation, when
a bridge is not available at the ﬁrst stage. The ﬁrst player moves the drone to (6,4)
(table 1, iteration 1), this reduces the diameter for player 1, to 14, whilst also reducing the
diameter for player 2, to 13, which means the payoﬀ after stage 1 is [2,2]. It also leaves the
second player with 11 options. However, at stage 2 opportunities for the better use of the
second player’s drone for the ﬁrst player are formed (table 1), i. e. two 2-bridges appear((3,3) − (3,4) and (4,3) − (4,4)) (highlighted in bold in table 1). Each of the strategies
result in payoﬀ [16 − 10,15 − 9] = [6,6]. The third 2-bridge is also available ((5,3) − (5,4)),
but it only brings the payoﬀ of [16 − 12,15 − 11] = [4,4]. For the rest of the strategies, both
players cannot improve achievements of the ﬁrst stage.
4.2. Example 2. Example 2 has been generated randomly on the 8 × 8 ﬁeld with
three lakes (Fig. 4) and it illustrates the non-cooperative nature of this game. The initial
diameters for the players are 15 and 12, correspondingly (table 2). The ﬁrst player has the
only minimising position (4,6), which brings 11 options for the second player. The pay-oﬀ
function after stage 1 is [15 − 13,12 − 11] = [2,1] for all 11 strategies. The next stage begins
with the ﬁrst player’s attempt to minimise its diameter by using the second drone. Thus,
some of the strategies give multiple options and the total number of strategies becomes
13 (see table 3).
The ﬁrst 5 strategies do not allow any improvements (as well as strategies 7, 10,
and 11) for both players, thus make no changes to the drones’ positions. However,
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Table 1. Example 1 strategies and payoﬀs
Strategy Position Diameters Payoﬀ
drone 1 drone 2 updated stage 1 stage 2
1 (6,4) (7,2) [14,13] [2,2] [2,2]
2 (6,4) → (3,4) (3,3) [14 → 10,13 → 9] [2,2] [6,6]
3 (6,4) → (4,4) (4,3) [14 → 10,13 → 9] [2,2] [6,6]
4 (6,4) → (3,3) (3,4) [14 → 10,13 → 9] [2,2] [6,6]
5 (6,4) → (4,3) (4,4) [14 → 10,13 → 9] [2,2] [6,6]
6 (6,4) (1,3) [14,13] [2,2] [2,2]
7 (6,4) (2,3) [14,13] [2,2] [2,2]
8 (6,4) → (5,4) (5,3) [14 → 12,13 → 11] [2,2] [4,4]
9 (6,4) (1,4) [14,13] [2,2] [2,2]
10 (6,4) (2,4) [14,13] [2,2] [2,2]
11 (6,4) → (5,3) (5,4) [14 → 10,13 → 9] [2,2] [4,4]
Table 2. Example 2 strategies and payoﬀs
Strategy Position Diameters Payoﬀ
drone 1 drone 2 updated stage 1 stage 2
1 (6,4) (4,1) [13,11] [2,1] [2,1]
2 (4,6) (2,2) [13,11] [2,1] [2,1]
3 (4,6) (5,2) [13,11] [2,1] [2,1]
4 (4,6) (2,3) [13,11] [2,1] [2,1]
5 (4,6) (2,4) [13,11] [2,1] [2,1]
6 (4,6) → (5,4) (4,4) → (4,6) [13 → 12 → 15,11] [2,1] [0,1]
7 (4,6) (2,5) [13,11] [2,1] [2,1]
8 (4,6) → (5,5) (4,5) [13 → 12,11] [2,1] [3,1]
9 (4,6) → (5,5) (4,5) → (4,6) [13 → 12 → 15,11] [2,1] [0,1]
10 (4,6) → (4,5) (5,5) [13,11] [2,1] [3,1]
11 (4,6) → (4,5) (5,5) → (4,6) [13 → 12 → 15,11] [2,1] [0,1]
12 (4,6) (5,8) [13,11] ? [2,1]
13 (4,6) (6,8) [13,11] ? [2,1]
the 6th strategy (drone 1 at (4, 6), drone 2 at (4, 5)) gives an opportunity for the ﬁrst
player to use the second drone as a 2-bridge ((4, 5), (5, 5)), which brings the diameter to
12 for both of the players. Now the second player ﬁnds a better position for the second
drone, namely (4, 6), which bring the diameter down to 11, however, that action increases
the diameter of the ﬁrst player to 15. A very similar situation happens with strategies 6
and 10 (see table 3). Strategy 8, where the ﬁrst drone was at (4, 6) and the second one
at (4, 4), after the ﬁrst stage, allows the 2-bridge ((5, 4) − (4, 4)) to appear after second
stage minimisation (see Fig. 4). Strategy number 9 is special, it allows two options for
the position of the second drone ((4, 5) and (4, 6)) after the ﬁrst drone was moved to
(5, 5). Both makes the diameter of the second player 11. However, only the ﬁrst option
leaves the diameter of 12 for the ﬁrst player, the second option makes the diameter 15.
Thus, two strategies lead to the bridge formation and bring the maximal total network
improvement, but at the same time, the two strategies degrade the total payoﬀ compared
with the outcomes of the ﬁrst stage.
4.3. Example 3. Allowing some foreseeing for the ﬁrst player would be a natural
extension of the game under consideration, since we look at the complete information
games. Consider the network built on a hexagonal grid (Fig. 5): the agents of the ﬁrst
player are depicted by black circles, the agents of the second player are red circles. The
green objects are obstacles, say forests. The game formulation is very similar, apart from
Вестник СПбГУ. Прикладная математика. Информатика... 2019. Т. 15. Вып. 1 31
this time we will allow the ﬁrst player to consider the strategies, that do not decrease the
diameter, but might allow to build “a bridge” on the next stage of the game.
Table 3. Network Conﬁguration
Parameter Value
Transmission radius 105 m
Geographical area 700 m×500 m
Number of nodes 16 for player 1
17 for player 2
Simulation time 1200 seconds
Source node (player 2) Node 0
Destination node (player 2) Node 15
Physical mode DSSS at 11 Mbps
Transfer rate CBR at 11 Mbps
Packet size 64 bits
Propagation loss model Friis propagation loss model
Player 1 channel number 1
Player 2 channel number 6
Routing protocol AODV
Transport protocol UDP
Figure 5. Example 3 topology
The set of strategies for the ﬁrst player is {A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H, I, J,K,L,M}
contains four potential drone positions (Fig. 6), that are not changing the diameters,
namely {H,K,L,M} . Table 4 presents the resulting payoﬀ after the ﬁrst stage of the game
in the fourth column. The latter strategies are highlighted in this table. However, if we
allow the ﬁrst drone to be in either of H,K,L,M, the second drone might be able to install
a connection over the polygonal forest, building one of the “bridges” K −H,K −M,K −L.
Table 4 presents the resulting strategies for example 3, the allowed positions H,K,L,M,
have brought signiﬁcant improvement of connection (see the last column of table 4).
5. Network Simulator 3. We have clearly discussed the beneﬁts of applying game
theory for the placement of mobile agents and we have used MATLAB to implement
the solution, however, we are also interested in the beneﬁts that the strategic placements
of the mobile agents would give in terms of network performance. Thus, scenarios and
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Figure 6. Possible strategies for the player 1, example 3
Table 4. Example 3 strategies and payoﬀs
Strategy Position Payoﬀ
drone 1 drone 2 stage 1 stage 2
1 A N [1,1] [1,3]
2 B A [1,0] [2,1]
3 C A [2,0] [3,1]
4 D A [2,0] [3,1]
5 E A [1,0] [2,1]
6 F A [2,0] [3,1]
7 G A [2,0] [3,1]
8 H K [0,0] [7,3]
9 I A [1,0] [2,1]
10 J A [1,0] [2,1]
11 K H [0,0] [7,3]
12 L K [0,0] [6,3]
13 M K [0,0] [6,2]
strategies from example 1 (see Fig. 2, table 1) were coded in C++ and simulated. Network
Simulator 3 (NS-3), which is a discrete network simulator used by many researchers [36],
was used.
The aim was to compare the network performance for the strategies played in
example 1 above. The resulting strategies presented in table 2 consist of six strategies
with a bridge being formed (strategies 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 11), with the clear game theory
winners (strategies 2–5).
The following experiment was designed: run each strategy for player 2 for 100 se-
conds, then the same scenario was run with no drones at all, this enabled us to compare
the results. Thus, we have a simulation running for 1100 seconds working through the
11 strategies that considered the placement of the mobile agents, and for a further 100 se-
conds with all drones removed (the drones were placed to positions where they could not
communicate with the other nodes, or with each other at simulation time, 1100 seconds).
Several callbacks (traces) were conﬁgured, two of which to captured packets
transmitted and received at the application layer, these were written to a vector and
then written to disk as a comma separated value ﬁle for analysis. The mobility was traced
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by capturing the time, x and y positions of each node, when the position of a node changed,
this was written to disk as a ASCII mobility ﬁle. Other data captured consisted of routing
tables and a ﬁle for use in Network Animator.
We measure network performance by the averaging the amount of successfully
delivered packets per unit of time. We envisaged that scenarios with bridges would perform
better than the rest of the scenarios.
5.1. Network configuration. Table 3 gives the other conﬁguration parameters used
for the scenario and are discussed subsequently. The simulation ran for 20 minutes to allow
time for each scenario (each placement of the drone), this also allowed for stabilisation
time for the route discovery process.
The routing protocol chosen for this experiment was Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector (AODV) because this protocol establishes routes to destinations on demand, this
kept the routes fresh. In line with the MATLAB experiment we placed our nodes in
locations akin to the placements used in MATLAB, the transmission radius for the nodes
was conﬁgured so that it was limited to 105 m, we placed our nodes 100 m apart to
correctly map with MATLAB, which gave a total geographical area of 700×500 m, a
visual representation can be seen in Fig. 2, Network Animator (NetAnim) was used to
validate the placement and transmission characteristics.
Traﬃc ﬂows between node 0 and node 15 were conﬁgured, with node 0 being the
source node and node 15 being the destination (sink), represented by S2 (source) and D
(destination) on Fig. 2. The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) transport protocol was used
to transmit a Constant Bit Rate (CBR) from the source at a rate of 11 Mbit/s.
The data used for the analysis consisted of the average received packet count for each
of the situations of drone placement so that we could measure the performance of the
network for each newly formed path based on the placement of the drone. In addition to
this, the analysis of hop counts at 90 second intervals, silence interval (times at which no
data were being received) and changes in topology were conducted.
In this research, we report on the network performance for player 2 only, however,
results for player 1 correlate with those of player 2. During the running of the simulation we
wanted to ensure that the paths between the source and the destination were as expected,
and that the data ﬂowed through the correct intermediate nodes and when applicable
through the mobile agent, therefore, before and after the placement of a mobile agent
routing tables were written to disk so this could be validated (Fig. 7).
Figure 7. AODV Routing Table for node 0 at 1190 seconds
5.2. Network performance analysis. The simulation allowed for the evaluation
of twelve strategies, eleven of which map the solutions in example 1 (see table 1). The
twelfth scenario was added so that the network performance could be evaluated without
the use of drones (mobile agents). This was expected to be the worst performing topology.
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The summary of results can be found in table 5 (as mentioned above, we are presenting
player 2 results due to the limited space and the outcome qualitatively being very similar).
Table 5. Example 1 simulations outcomes
Position Resulting Number of Average Total silence
drone 1 drone 2 diameter hops rate interval
(6,4) (7,2) 13 13 21.396 24
(3,4) (3,3) 9 7 28.447 15
(4,4) (4,3) 9 9 32.389 11
(3,3) (3,4) 9 7 32.568 6
(4,3) (4,4) 9 9 30.802 10
(6,4) (1,3) 13 13 19.968 24
(6,4) (2,3) 13 13 20.874 23
(5,4) (5,3) 11 11 26.609 13
(6,4) (1,4) 13 13 22.723 18
(6,4) (2,4) 13 13 25.907 11
(5,3) (5,4) 9 11 27.899 8
(10,10) (8,8) 15 15 16.768 15
Table 5 presents the summary of the measurements for all twelve strategies (scenario)
with the visualisation shown in Fig. 8.
Figure 8. Mean number of packets per second
The diameter was calculated as the longest of all the shortest paths between any
two nodes on the graph, while the number of hops was obtained from the AODV routing
tables (see Fig. 7) recorded every 100 seconds throughout the simulation. There was a slight
discrepancy due to the diﬀerent algorithms calculating the most optimal route, however,
the number of hops is always taken between node 0 and node 15 (nodes S2 and D on
Fig. 2), whereas the diameter could be longer for the other pair of nodes in the graph.
The total silence interval has been calculated as the number of seconds with no
successful communication between the source and the destination. The bridges of drones
were built and broken throughout the simulation, so we expected some delays in established
communication. For simplicity of analysis, we plotted the mean amount of successfully
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delivered packets per second for each scenario on Fig. 8. The latter numbers are treated
as a measure of the network performance. It is clear from Fig. 8, that six scenarios, where
the drones were placed such that the “bridges” were formed, are the best in terms of
performance depicted by green circles. One can even imagine a clear threshold line (say,
25 packets per second) that separates them from the rest of the scenarios shown as a red
horizontal line. The last scenario with no drones included, performed the worst as expected
(coloured red in Fig. 8).
6. Conclusion. A novel game-theoretic model of mobile agents’ placement on a Mobi-
le Ad-hoc network was considered and an example of a game played has been implemented
in MATLAB. To test if the scheme increased the performance of the network NS-3. The
analysis performed on the data derived from the simulation shows that the results are
positive, and that network performance clearly increased in the cases of mobile agents’
positions proposed by the application of game theory.
The future research will include a detailed analysis of the observed phenomena and
will concentrate on the design of new classes of strategies, including cooperative ones, to
allow all players achieving the best possible outcomes. We will also consider more players
and the use of more mobile agents. We are also interested in adding some randomness,
say, the agents randomly are taken oﬀ the game with some apriori given probability.
Introducing the cost of drone usage, would allow to include energy-eﬃciency. Drone’s
active time is currently quite limited, thus it is vital to limit its utilization time. Hence we
plan to consider the game which might ﬁnish at any random point in time [37].
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Повышение качества работы беспроводной децентрализованной сети
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Для цитирования: Blakeway S., Gromov D. V., Gromova E. V., Kirpichnikova A. S.,
Plekhanova T. M. Increasing the performance of a Mobile Ad-hoc Network using a game-theoretic
approach to drone positioning // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Прикладная
математика. Информатика. Процессы управления. 2019. Т. 15. Вып. 1. С. 22–38. https://
doi.org/10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.102 (In English)
В статье описывается новая теоретико-игровая постановка задачи размещения мобиль-
ных агентов при наличии беспроводных децентрализованных сетей (MANET). Задача
сформулирована как многошаговая игра с полной информацией, даны определения как
равновесия по Нэшу, так и кооперативного решения. Предложена модификация игры
для обеспечения существования равновесия по Нэшу. В MATLAB разработана среда
моделирования, позволяющая анализировать различные стратегии игроков. Програм-
ма генерирует различные игровые ситуации и определяет местоположение мобильного
агента для каждого игрока, решая соответствующие задачи оптимизации. Применяя
разработанную среду, подробно были рассмотрены два конкретных игровых сценария.
Предложенный алгоритм был реализован и протестирован с использованием Network
Simulator 3 (NS-3). Результаты показывают, что данный алгоритм повышает произво-
дительность сети.
Ключевые слова: MANET, динамические игры, многошаговые игры, местоположение
дронов, графы, равновесие по Нэшу, беспроводные сети.
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